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DISCRETIONARY POWER AND PROCEDURAL RIGHTS IN THE GRANTING AND
REVOKING OF PROBATION
JOEL BASSETT
Current emphasis in the criminal law has shifted
from its punitive purpose to the rehabilitative and
preventive.1 While the prevention of crime was
once considered to serve a prophylactic effect,

2

today focus is on the treatment of offenders and
the factors which bring about criminal behavior.3
Probation today stands as both an example and
an instrument of this new emphasis.
Probation is designed to promote rehabilitation.4

I See generally, Tan PRISON-STuDIEs IN INSTITUTIONAL ORGANIZATION AND CHANGE'(D. Cressy ed.
1961).
2

,

Andenaep,' General Prevention-llusionor Reality?,
4331. Cant. L.C. & P.S. 176 (1952).
See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMnISSION ON CIviL DisORDERS (1968); ADVISORY COmmiTTEE OP EXPERTS ON
THE PREVENTION oP C
AND T
TREAT=ENT OP
OFFENDERS, INTERNATIONAL ACTION IN
E FI ELD o
SocI~i DEFENcE (1966).
4

Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 1945).
(1932);
Springer v. United States, 148 F.2d 411 (9th Cir.
Probation and parole are two types of conditional

liberty. Probation occurs when a convicted criminal is

allowed to remain free in society after his conviction,
subject only to the supervision of a trained officer ahd

certain additional requirements. This is done by way
of a suspended sentence wherein either the imposition
or the execution of the sentence is postponed. Parole, on
the other hand, occurs after the criminal has served part
of his sentence. It is usually administered by an executive agency rather than the courts. .Confusion begins
when one of the conditions imposed on a probationer is
that he serve a portion of his sentence before returning
to society. See, e.g., Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128
(19675; Breeding v. Swenson, 240 Minn. 93, 60 N.W.2d

Prolonged imprisonment may impede rather than
aid the correction of an individual's criminal predispositions 5 since many prisons lack the facilities
6
necessary to treat individual prisoner's needs.
Probation, on the other hand, provides the reward
of conditional liberty to those who can demonstrate
the ability and willingness to act in a lawful manner over a certain period of time (usually five
years or less) ? The probationer need never serve a
4 (1953); People v. Jennings, 129 Cal. App.2d 120, 276
P.2d 124 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954). Although this is called
"probation", it might be more consistent to treat these
situations as judicial recommendations to the parole
board. Such a distinction may be more academic than
useful due to the common juxtaposition of probatfon
and parole in legal theory. See Weihofen, Revoking
Probation, Parole or Pardon Without a Hearing, 32
J. CR. L.C. & P.S. 531 (1942). But the rights of a

probationer and a parolee are distinguished in McCoy
v. Harris, 108 Utah 407, 160 P.2d 721. (1945). RuBIN,
THE LAW OP C nnNAL CoRREcTIQN (1963), provides a

general discussion of the area.
5THE PRIsON-STUDIEs IN

INSTITUTIONAL ORGANIZATION AND CHANGE, 23 (D. Cressy ed. 1961).
6 NATIONAL PROBATION AND PAROLE AssOCIATION,
Forward to 1955 STANDARD PROBATION AND PAROLE

AcT
7 at vi (1955).
E.g., 18 U.S.C. §3651 (1951) provides a maximum
probation period of five years. In 1965, according to
ADN. Orrci
or THE UNITED STATES CoURTs 1966
ANN. REP. 124, the median period imposed was 24.5
months and the median period served was 20.2 months,

17% being discharged prior to the original expiration
date of their probation.
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day in prison.8 The conditions imposed on his
liberty and the guidance afforded by a trained
officer provide the necessary control, direction,
and encouragement for this rehabilitation process.
With this help, the probationer is given the opportunity to correct his anti-social behavior within, rather than apart from, the social context and
tensions which may foster problems. This process
attempts to facilitate the criminal's re-entry into
society as a productive member. 9 In short, the
strength of the probation system reflects emphasis
on the positive treatment of the criminal within
society rather than the punitive separation of him
from society. In this way, probation benefits both
the probationer and society.10
Congress and all of the state legislatures have
recognized the soundness of this rehabilitative approach by enacting statutes creating probation."
Nonetheless, few statutes are specific as to when
or how to grant or revoke probation;12 instead,
individual trial courts have exercised broad discretionary powers.13 As will be seen, this discretion
has occasionally been abused and the time has
come to make a fresh analysis of the function it
serves and of the safeguards available against
arbitrary judicial action.
GRANTING PROBATION
Procedure
Generally a criminal may be placed on probation or given a suspended sentence after trial,14
8 Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 273 (1943)
(dissenting opinion).
9Society's commitment to the goals of probation is
shown by the fact that 144,000 persons were placed on
adult probation by state courts in 1965. PRE SDENT'S
COiMSSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE
ADMINI STRATION OF JUSTICE (hereinafter referred to as
PRESIDENT'S CRE ComssION), TAsIC FORCE REPORT: CoRREcTIoNs 202 (1967).

10 In 1966, the cost of supervising a person on probation for one day was only 67; the cost of imprisonment
for one day was 87.54, disregarding the added benefits
of probationer's income, family support, and avoidance
of the prison stigma. AnmN. OFFCE oF
UNITED
STATeS COURTS 1966 ANN. REP. 128.
1The first probation law was enacted in 1878, MAss.
AcT ch. 198 (1878). Subsequently, Congress passed
The Federal Probation Act of 1925, ch. 521, §725, 43
Stat. 1260. Ru
obr,
THE LAw OF Cnas
CoUcTION (1963), and Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S.
264 (1943), give accounts of the origin of probation in
the United States.
"Note, Legal Aspects of Probation Revocation, 59
COLum. L. REv. 311 (1959); Brief for National Legal
Aid and Defender Association as Anicus Curiae,
Appendix A,Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
"1Bums v. United States, 287 U.S. 216 (1932); Kirsch
v. United States, 173 F.2d 652 (8th Cir. 1949); People
v. Oskroba,
305 N.Y. 113, 111 N.E.2d 235 (1953).
4
1 A few countries have permitted imposition of
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whereby either the imposition 5 or the execution' 6
of the sentence is postponed. Under either type,
if the probationer abides by the conditions placed
on his liberty, he will be released 7 Nonetheless,
the distinction between suspended imposition and
suspended execution may be significant in determining procedural rights upon revocation of
probation. The Supreme Court of the United
States has held recently that a probationer has a
right to counsel in probation revocation hearings
at which a deferred sentence may be imposed."8
But several lower federal courts have distinguished
this case and denied the right to counsel at such
hearings when only the execution of the sentence
had been deferred. 19
The imposition of a sentence after probation
revocation is unlike most sentencing situations in
that the court has knowledge of defendant's postconviction activities. This may influence the
length of the sentence if he has proved to be unresponsive to correctional measures. 0 To avoid
probation before trial in instances where there is no
doubt of the person's guilt. U.N. DEP'T OF Soc. ArFAIRS, DrvIsioN OF SocIAL WELFARE, PRACTICAL
REsULTS AN FINANcIAL ASPECTS OF ADULT PROBATiON IN SELECTED COUNTRIEs, 38, 56 (1953) (Norway,
Denmark, and the Netherlands). Although the person
is spared the stigma of a criminal conviction, he is
discouraged from attempting to prove his innocence.
Such a procedure may have constitutional problems
and, if used at all, should be restricted to youthful
offenders.
10
See, e.g., In re Perez, 65 Cal.2d 224, 418 P.2d 6, 53
Cal. Rptr. 414 (1966); People v. Price, 24 Ill. App.2d
364, 164 N.E.2d 528 (1960); Gebhart v. Gladden, 243
Ore. 145, 412 P.2d 29 (1966); Smith v. State, 33 Wis.2d
695, 148 N.W.2d 39 (1967).

;See, e.g., Williams v. Commonwealth, 350 Mass.
732, 216 N.E.2d 779 (1966); Blea v. Cox, 75 N.M. 265,

403 P.2d 701 (1965); People v. Hamilton, 26 A.D.2d
134, 271 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1966); Perry v. Williard, 247
Ore. 145, 427 P.2d 1020 (1967).
17If the prisoner does not obey the conditions, he
may be imprisoned. Twenty-five years ago in Korematsu v. United States, 319 U.S. 432, 435 (1943), the
Supreme Court indicated that the difference between
release and imprisonment was one of "trifling degree."
The suspended imposition of sentence is in reality
another form of indeterminate sentence, allowing the
length of a criminal's sentence to depend on the measure
of his improvement.
18Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
F9SE.g., United States ex rel. Bishop v. Brierly, 288
F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Holder v. United States,
285 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. Tex. 1968); People v. Jones,
-

C. 1.2d -,

-

P.2d -,

70 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1968);

Petition of DuBois, 445 P.2d 354 (Nev. 1968).
"0 Hink, The Application of Constitutional Standards
of Protection to Probation, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. 483,
495-6 (1962); Note, Legal Aspects of .ProbationRevocation, 59 CoLUM. L. REv. 311, 322 (1959).
Where the criminal is placed on probation under a
suspended imposition of sentence, it is practically
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this result, state courts could impose sentence at
trial and only suspend its execution. Even if the
same procedural safeguards are subsequently required for revocation of both types of probation,
the convicted criminal who chooses probation
should have the opportunity of knowing the alternative prison sentence. Such information might
aid his rehabilitation by making him more willing
to fulfill the conditions of the court's probation
order.0
Selection
Because funds and supervisory personnel are
limited, it is particularly important to place on
probation only those criminals with potential for
reform. Many courts use presentence investigation
reports as aids in determiningwho shouldbe granted
probation.n Although the use of such reports is
generally accepted, it is still difficult to determine
factors in assessing a person's potential for rehabilitation through conditional liberty.n Four
impossible to prove that probationer received a greater
sentence upon revocation than he would have received
immediately after trial. However, in a few cases of
probation under a suspended execution of sentence there
have been attempts to raise the sentence which was
originally imposed. One federal court in Remer v.
Regan, 104 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1939), stated that
such was permissible. Another federal court agreed in
Roberts v. United States, 131 F.2d 392, 393 (5th Cir.
1943), but on appeal the Supreme Court of the United
States found that Congress did not intend such in the
Federal Probation Act of 1925, thus reversing while
reserving the question of double jeopardy under the
Fifth Amendment. See Roberts v. United States, 320
U.S. 264,265 (1943); U.S. DEP'T or JusTIcE ATToREY

factors are commonly used in selection: age, prior
record, current offense, and psychological stability.N There are also indications that criminals
with good family relationships, consistency of occupation, and at least an average education have
a better rehabilitation record when placed on pro25
bation than those without those characteristics.
More needs to be known about the factors which
establish a criminal's potential for rehabilitation.
Once these factors which influence rehabilitation
are isolated and understood, a significant change
in the selection criteria may occur. For example,
the crime which the individual committed is
26
presently considered a critical factor in selection.
But the crime is not necessarily a relevant factor;
it may be the symptom of certain underlying
causes. If the rehabilitation criteria are isolated and
recognized, the criminal's propensity for treatment may replace the crime itself as the major
factor in selection for probation. As knowledge of
proper treatment expands, more individuals may
be placed on probation and returned to society as
productive members; the prisons can become,
"instead of mass custody centers, specialized and
professionalized rehabilitation services for the
relatively small number of offenders requiring institutional treatment."
ConditionsImposed

Some of the more serious, but as yet unanswered,
legal problems in the granting of probation center
around the nature of the conditions imposed. Some
limitations must be imposed on the broad powers
GENERAL's SuRVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES, vol. 1
at2113 (1939).
of the granting authority to prevent abuses of
Hink, The Application of Constitutional Standards discretion.
of Protection to Probation,29 U. Cm. L. REv. 483, 495
In People v. Turner,n an individual convicted of
(1962).
2ADmIN. OFFicE or Tn UN=TD STATES CouRTs,
the attempted sale of narcotics had been granted
THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT (1965);
probation on the condition that he "immediately
Rubin, Probation and Due Process of the Law, 11 CaswE
& DELINQUENCY 30 (Jan. 1965).
go to Buffalo State Hospital and be under care of
23 Statistics taken from numerous courts within a
Dr. Burnett." Probationer obeyed this directive
large jurisdiction may tend to mask variations which
exist among individual courts. Even where federal and but subsequently left the hospital, reporting to
state statistics remain reasonably constant, the use of probation supervision on the following day. Alprobation among individual judges may vary from most four months later, probationer was arrested
5% to 70% of the cases before them. Rubin, Probation
and Due Process of the Law, 11 Canm & DELN. 30, 33 upon order of the trial judge and charged with vio(Jan. 1965). For example in 1966, Hartford, Connecticut, granted 2,120 new probation cases while Denver,
24FEDERAL PROBATION, Sosx FINDINGS FROM Col133. Brief for National Legal
Colorado,
Aid and granted
Defenderonly
Association as Amicus Curiae, RECTIONAL CASELOAD RESEARCH 53 (1967).
25
U.N. DEP'T OF Soc. AEFAiRs, supra note 14, at 84;
Appendix B, Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
An even greater variance exists as to the propor- U.S. DEr'T OF JusTicE, ATTOmNY GENERAL's SuRvEY
tionate number of probationers who have their proba- OF RELEASE PROCEDURES, vol. 2, Probation, 335ff.
tion revoked. In Los Angeles, for example, there were (1939).
26
See note 24, supra.
5,653 new probation cases and 4,027 revocations in
v NATIONAL PROBATION AND PAROLE AssOciATIoN,
1966. But during the same year Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, granted probation to 4,233 while revoking only Forward to 1955 STANDARD PROBATION AND PAROLE:
249. Moreover, these figures are recurrent rather than AcT, at vi (1955).
s 27 A.D.2d 141, 276 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1967).
abnormal. Id.
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lating a condition of his probation by leaving the
hospital without the consent of his doctor. Probationer's case history and the reports of his
probation officer during this time show that he
was leading a normal life:

...that the ends of justice and the best interests of the public, as well as the defendant
will be subserved ... to place the defendant
upon probation for such period and upon such
terms and conditions as they may deem best.32

This youth continues to demonstrate a sincere, cooperative, and mature attitude regarding the conditions of his probation imposed and no reports of misconduct or the use
of narcotics have been received.u

Nearly all state statutes have followed a similar
approach. 33 Only very recently have a few states,
such as Illinois, 34 attempted to list possible conditions in their statures. Even the listed conditions
are merely suggestive: the Illinois probationer may
be required to "perform or refrain from performing
such other acts as may be ordered by the court." 11
Only the term of his probation and the amount of
the fine are limited.
As a result. of the lack of guidelines, probation
authorities have at times lost sight of the goals of
conditional liberty and fairness to the probationer.
A few trial courts have imposed rather harsh conditions on a probationer's liberty. 6 -For example,
the sterilization, of a syphilitic rapist has been up-

At the probation revocation hearing some evidence indicated that probationer was arrested because he, a Negro, was seeing a white girl and the
girl's parents swore that he was inducing her to
use drugs. The original trial judge conducted the
hearing, despite suggestions that he disqualify
himself and found that there had been a breach of
conditions which compelled probation revocation.
The appellate court reversed the probation
revocation and held that the appellant had the
right to a definitive statement of probation conditions and also the right to appeal:
'Thus, in finality, although the -probation officer conceded on cross-examination that perhaps both he and appellant hadmisunderstood
the terms of probation, the trial judge either
had a mental reservation that apbellant should
not leave the hospital without the consent of
the named doctor or this unexpressed, condition was formulated and implemented to end
the association between appellant and a female not of his race.30

n2Federal Probation Act of 1925, ch. 521 §725, 43
Stat. 1259.
1 See Sklar, Law and Practice in Probationand Parole
Revocation Hearings,55 J.Cam. L.C. &P.S. 175 (1964),
for a listing of the probation and parole statutes in this
country.
4 IL. STAT.ANN.ch.38 §117-2,provides as follows:
(a) A person admitted to probation shall be subject
to the following conditions:
(1) Not violate 4ny penal statute- or ordinance of
any jurisdiction,
(2).Not leave ihe State without thae
cofisent of
the court
(3) -Make a-report to sucn person Or agency ano
at suca umes as rme court may direct add
shall appear in person before thecourtat such
time as the cofurt may direct.

Justice was done in this case, but the danger posed
by vague probation conditions is evident. In more
general terms, Turner exemplifies the problem
raised when the authority that grants probation
has the power to impose and interpret whatever
conditions it may choose.
Since the first probation law in 1878, ' statutes
authorizing conditional liberty have been consistently silent on the type of conditions that may
be imposed. The first federal probation act in
1925 authorized courts of original jurisdiction,
when satisfied
290 Id. at 412.

3 Id. at 412.
31MAss. AcTs ch. 198 (1878). For a general history
of probation in the United States see RUBi, THE LAW
OF CRmIIIINA CORRECTION (1963) and Roberts v. United
States, 320 U.S. 264 (1943).

) txecute a recogmzance in accordance -with
the provisions of Article 110 of this Code.
(b), A person admitted to probation mayr be subject
to the following conditions:
(1) Imprisoned in a place of confinemefit ,other
than a penitentiary for a period not to exceed
one year and in no event-tq exceed the maximum penalty for the offense.
,
(2) Pay within a period set by the court a fine not
to exceed the maximum provided for the
offense.
(3) Pay the cost of the proceedings as set by the
court.
(4) Make restitution or reparation within the
period of probation in an amount not. to
exceed actual loss or damage- to property or
medical expense resulting from bodily injury
to,person.
(5) Perform or refrain from performing such
other acts as may be ordered by the court.
6
See Springer v. United States, 148 F.2d 411 (9th
Cir. 1945), where a condition requiring a gift of blood to
the Red Cross was invalidated. See note 37, infra.
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held as a valid condition for his probation. '
Some courts have attempted to further their regional interests by exiling probationers."
In addition, a probationer may not be adequately
informed of the conditions. A number of probation
revocations have been overturned for vague conditions.3 9 But revocations based on implied conditions 40 or on the requirements of the probation
statute' have been upheld despite the fact that a
probationer was not explicitly informed of them,
These defects are particularly serious in an area
of ihd law which is devoted to rehabilitation and
treatment of offenders. It would-seem difficult to
engender the proper respect for the laws in an individual who is being treated unfairly by them.
His acceptance of probation as an alternative to
imprisonment gives no justification fdr conditions
which do not promote hig rehabilitation.
In order to prevent these defects-from recurring,
some 'ttitudes toward probation must be altered,
ad the discretionary power of the courts must'be
limited. Probation must no longer be viewed as
quasi-judicial- or administrative in nature.4 2It is
part of the criminal law, andthe-types of- conditioris that may be imposed should be brought into
keeping with it. This calls for action by the federal
and- state legislitures or at least by the courts
through judge-made law. Although probation is a
"favor, not a 'c6ntract",4 limitations might be
stated mo~t dearly in contract terminology. conditions should be explicit, reasonable, and 'for an
expressed maximum term.
The probationer should receive adequate notice
of what is demanded of him. .Where a statute such
'7People v. Blankenship, i6 Cal. App.2d 606, 61
P.2d 352 (1036).
-State
U
ex rd. Halverson v. Young, 278 Minn. 381,
154 N.W.2d 699 (1967); In re Scarborough, 76 Cal.
'App.2d 648, 173 P.2d 825 (1946); People v. Baum,
2519 Mich. 187, 231 N.W. 95 (1930).
3 People v. Turner, 276 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1967);
Morgan v. Foster, 208 Ga. 630,68 S.E.2d 583 (1952).
10Buhler v. pescor, 63 F. Supp. 632 (W.D. Mo. 1945).
'" State v. Shyrock, 86 Ohio App. "210, 89 N.E.2d 90
(1949); People v. Hunter; 42 Cal. App.2d 87, 108 P.2d
472 (1940).
"See Mempa v. Rhay, 68 Waah. 882, 416 P.2d 104
and the opinion of the Supreipe Court at 389 U.S. 128
.(1967)..
a Burms v. United States, 287 U.S. 216,220 (1932).

44Hollandsworth v. United States, 34 F.2d 423 (4th
Cir. 1929); Cross v. Huff, 208 Ga. 392, 67 S.E.2d 124
(1951); City of Lima v. Beer, 90 Ohio App. 527, 107
N.E.2d 253 (1950); State v. White, 218 S.C. 130, 61
S.E.2d 754 (1950); State v. Gooding, 194 N.C. 271,
139 S.E. 436 (1927). But cf. Kaplan v. United States,
234 F.2d 345, 349 (8th Cir. 1956) (directions of trial
judge to make disclosures to a grand jury); Buhier v.
Pescor, 63 F. Supp. 632, 638 (W.D. Mo. 1945) (hiplied

as the Illinois probation statute45 imposes certain
conditions on all those granted conditional liberty,
probationers should nonetheless be directly informed of these statutory conditions. It can be
argued that a condition not to break the law should
be implied in every grant of probation. 46 But, at
most, this implied condition should only extend to
illegal conduct which displays a failure to accept
rehabilitative treatment and poses a definite risk
to society. For example, this implied condition
might prohibit only the commission of felonies. 7 At
any rate, probation revocation based on such an
iniplied condition should only occur after a proper
adjudication of guilt in the new crime.41
:"As exemplified by Tu,'ner,49 vague conditions
carry a potential danger of abuse which-may lead
the probationer to believe that.he has.been tricked
even when the granting authority honestly concludes that 'the conditions which he intended to
impose have been breached. These possible results
are inconsistent -with the goal of -rehabilitation.
Vague conditions also, cause the courts-problems of
interpretation. Some 'courts have narrowly interpreted them so as to preserve the effectiveness- of
the restrictions as to other conduct. 50 'Unfortunately,
this does not solve the problems raised by such a
cofidition. A better approach, taken by at least
one court,9 would be to invalidate thei condition
altogether. This would probably deter theirfurther
use and largely eliminate the problem.
condition to act in a way "that will lead to his rehabilifation").
11See note 34, supra.
46 Whitehead v. United States, 155 F.2d 460 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 747 (1946) (impljed condition not to commit a felony); Buhler v. Pescor, 63 F.
Supp. 632 '(W.D. Mo. 1945) (same).
'47 See cases cited in note 46.
4
1 Seenotes 85-87 and accompanying text.
4
' See notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
Other examples of vague conditions are found in:
Swan v. State, 200 Md. 420, 90 A.2d 690 (1952) (defendant "should conduct himself in a law-abiding
manner"); State v. McBride, 240 N.C. 619, 83 S.E.2d
488 (1954) (condition. that- "defendant be of good
behavior and violate-none of the laws of this state");
Williams v. Harris, 106 Utah 387, 149 P.2d 640 (1944)
(condition that defendant "straighten up").
16Swan V. State, 200 Md. 420, 90 A.2d 690 (1952)
(condition that probationer "conduct himself in a lawabiding manner" not breached by violating a statute
against placing posters on private property without the
owner's consent); State v. McBride, 240 N.C. 619, 83
S.E.2d 488 (1954) (condition that probationer "be of
good behavior and violate none of the laws of the state"
not breached by the commission of a crime in another
state).
. "Morgan v. Foster, 208 Ga. 630, 68 S.E.2d 583
(1952) (condition that probationer "maintain a correct
life").
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Conditions should also be reasonbaly related to
the purposes of the probation statutes5 2 and should
not be dependent on events beyond probationer's
control.Y Nor should they be so exceedingly harsh
that they unnecessarily encourage a breach or alter
the fundamental force of the program from one of
positive reform to one of negative coercion.
Finally, the conditions should be imposed for a
fixed term during which they should not be altered
without cause. Some state statutes permit courts
to extend the terms and alter the conditions 55 to
any requirements that might have been originally
imposed. Such should not be done solely on the
suggestion of a supervisory officer,56 but should
take effect only after a thorough investigation and
clear expression of the cause for the change.
These limitations on the discretionary powers of
the granting authorities would provide a broad
framework within which their discretion could
operate and, at the same time, prevent many
possible abuses. The probationer should: not be
made to feel that he is at the complete mercy of
the supervisory officials or the granting authority.
He should be helped to understand fully the conditions that have been imposed on him. But with
the exception of these conditions, he should be
made to feel that he is a full member of society
who can rely on the protections and privileges of
the law.
There is still great discretion as to the conditions that might be imposed to promote rehabilitation effectively. These restrictions should in some
way be related to the individual and the crime
52 People v. Dominguez, 256 Cal. App.2d 663, 64
Cal. Rptr. 290 (1967) (condition that robber not become
pregnant while unwed); Hollandsworth v. United
States, 34 F.2d 423, 427 (4th Cir. 1929) (dictum);
Varela v. Merrill, 51 Ariz. 64, 76, 74 P.2d 569, 574
(1937) (dictum); Redewill v. Superior Court, 43 Ariz.
68, 78, 29 P.2d 475, 479 (1934) (dictum); see CAL.
PEN. CODE §1203.1 (1967). But see Hink, The Application of Constitutional Standards of _Protection to Probation, 29 U. Cm. L. REV. 483, 488 (1962), where this
limitation is challenged as meaningless.
3

RuBIN,

CRni

AND

JuvENsrE

DELINQUENCY

178-79 (1958); Hollandsworth v. United States, 34
F.2d 423, 427 (4th Cir. 1929) (dictum); see Fuller v.
State, 122 Ala. 32, 37, 26 So. 146, 147 (1899); Pagano
v. Bechly, 211 Iowa 1294, 1298, 232 N.W. 798, 799
(1930).
r E.g., 18 U.S.C. §3651 (1952); IDAno CoDE ANN.
§20-222
(1948); NEB. REV. S.AT. §29-2219 (1956).
55
E.g., Axiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §13-1657 (1956);
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-35-17 (1953). But cf. In re Bine,
4756Cal.2d 814,306 P.2d 445 (1957).
Bid see Hollandsworth v. United States, 34 F.2d
423 (4th Cir. 1929); Excoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 493
(1935).
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committed.u For example, if the individual used
an automobile in committing the crime of which
he was initially convicted, probation might be
granted on the condition that his driver's license
be withheld. If he needed a car in his occupation,
however, limited use of the automobile might be
appropriate. But care should be taken, at least in
the early stages of probation, not to make the
conditions so difficult to enforce (from the standpoint of the supervisory officer's ability to know
whether they have been breached or not) that the
individual is tempted to disobey them, Furthermore, if the conditions are breached, the granting
authority might be well-advised to stiffen the
conditions rather than revoke probation.
In addition to the above limitations, constitutional provisions may be invoked as further limitations on the discretionary powers of those who
grant probation. In 1935 the Supreme Court of
the United States stated that a probationer has no
constitutional right to be granted or to retain his
probation." The Court characterized probation as
merely legislative grace, a privilege but not a right.
This opinion has been widely cited in subsequent
cases59 and has formed a further basis for the assertion that the legislatures had vested the courts
with discretionary powers in this area.60 At least
five states have departed from this traditional
view, however, and have found that their state
constitutions did give certain rights (mostly
procedural rights at a revocation proceeding) to
those placed on conditional liberty.' With the
growth of this opposing authority, many of the
conditions which were previously deemed permissible are now being questioned.
Conditions requiring sterilization 2 or the "donation" of blood to the Red CrossO could be argued
to violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against the infliction of cruel and unusual punish57KEvE, PROBATION (1960).
8Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490
59

(1935).
E.g., Brown v. Warden, 351 F.2d 564 (7th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1028 (1966); Franklin v.
State, 87 Idaho 291, 392 P.2d 552 (1964); Shum v.
Fogliani, 82 Nev. 156,413 P.2d 495 (1966).
60See cases cited in note 59.
61
Brill v. State, 159 Fla. 682, 32 So.2d 607 (1947)
(dictum); Ex parte Lucero, 23 N.M. 433, 168 P. 713
(1917); Perry v. Williard, 247 Ore. 145, 427 P.2d 1020
(1967); State v. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 259 P. 1044
(1927); State v. O'Neal, 174 Wash. 169, 265 P. 175
(1928).
62People v. Blankenship, 16 Cal. App.2d 606, 61
P.2d
352 (1936).
6
Springer v. United States, 148 F.2d 411 (9th Cir.
1945).
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ment. 4 A convicted criminal's acceptance of probation might not constitute waiver of this right
when faced with the coercive alternative of a long
prison term. Since the purpose of probation is not
punitive, one might have difficulty establishing
that such a condition is "punishment" within the
meaning of the constitutional provision.65 However, where the condition is extremely harsh and
lacks significant rehabilitative value, it would seem
that the defendant is put in the position of choosing
between different forms of punishment. He then
should be able to attack the condition as unconstitutional.
The condition that requires the criminal to refrain from committing any further crimes during
his term of probation might also be questioned.
This condition can be valid on its face and yet be
used to accomplish results of questionable constitutionality. Because a lower standard of proof
controls proceedings for the revocation of conditional liberty,66 the probationer may be sent to
prison by a revocation proceeding even though he
is found innocent of the new crime in a subsequent
criminal prosecution. 7 But, since the re-imprisonment may be interpreted as merely an enforcement
of the original crimes it is doubtful that this
practice or the condition which permits it will be
found unconstitutional. Furthermore, at least from
the viewpoint of preventing abuses or errors, the
new crime may be regarded as no different than
any other breach of conditions. The possibility that
an authority may conclude that an individual
6 Note, Legal Aspects of Probation Revocation, 59
CoLu N. L. Rxv. 311, 319 (1959); Hink, The Application of ConstitutionalStandards of Protection to Probation, 29 U. Car. L. R1v. 483, 489 (1962). There are some
jurisdictions in which a criminal must accept probation
when "granted" it. Cooper v. United States, 91 F.2d
195 (5th Cir. 1937); Ex park Boyd, 73 Okla. Crim. 441,
122 P.2d 162 (1942); State v. Farmer, 39 Wash.2d 675,
237 P.2d 734 (1951).
65Note, Legal Aspects of Probation Revocation, 59
CoLumr.
L. REv. 311, 319 (1959).
6
1Manning v. United States, 161 F.2d 827 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 792 (1947); Blaylock v. State, 88
Ga. App. 880, 78 S.E.2d 537 (1953); People v. Valle, 7
Misc.2d 125,164 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1957).
67Riggs v. United States, 14 F.2d 5 (4th Cir. 1926);
cert. denied, 273 U.S. 719 (1926); Jianole v. United
States, 58 F.2d 115 (8th Cir. 1932); see People v. Kuduk,
320 Dl. App. 610, 51 N.E.2d 997 (1945), appeal dismissed, 388 Ill. 248, 57 N.E.2d 755 (1944); State v.
Greer, 173 N.C. 759, 92 S.E. 147 (1917). As indicated
by these cases and People v. White, 98 Ill. App.2d 1,
239 N.E.2d 854 (1968), the criminal might never be
tried for the new crime since he can be imprisoned,
supposedly for his original crime, with less proof in a
probation
revocation proceeding.
6
8 See cases cited in note 67, supra.

breached his conditions even though he did not, in
fact, do so is an ever-present and inescapable
danger. This can be minimized only by affording
greater procedural safeguards to a probationer at
revocation proceedings.69
REvOKING PROBATION
Whereas the grant of probation is designed to
promote rehabilitation, the purpose of probation
revocation is to protect society and to punish the
probationer, when he has violated one of the conditions placed on his freedomY° In effect, the court
reverses its earlier decision granting probation on
the pragmatic grounds that the prophylactic need
so outweighs the rehabilitative benefits that no
mere alteration of the probation conditions would
sufficiently control the probationer's anti-social
tendenciesE Prison then becomes the only solution.
There are at least three reasons why there should
be less discretion in revoking probation than in
denying it originally. First, where there is informal
procedure and judicial discretion, there is also a
greater chance for error and abuse. Improper denial
of probation would seem to have a less detrimental
effect on a criminal than improper revocation of
probation. If a convicted criminal deserves probation and is denied it, then society has lost an opportunity for more effective rehabilitation of this
person; if a probationer is imprisoned for an alleged
violation of conditions which, in fact, never occurred, then society has also discouraged a reformer from rehabilitation, inducing frustration
and resentment in him. Thus, the risk of thwarting
the rehabilitative purpose of probation would be
less if discretionary power were restricted ir probation revocation proceedings.
Second, a program of rehabilitation suited to a
particular criminal must depend on so many factors
69 A condition requiring the criminal to make restitution for the damage caused by his crime, even though
there has been no claim and no adjudication of causation or damages, might also be violative of the individual's due process rights. People v. Becker, 349 Mich.
476, 84 N.W.2d 833 (1957); State v. Barnett, 110 Vt.
221, 3 A.2d 521 (1939). Contra, Swanson v. State, 38
Ga. App. 386, 144 S.E. 49 (1928); State v. Teal, 108
S.C. 455, 95 S.E. 69 (1918). One could also argue that
it denies paupers equal protection. But cf. Ex park
Banks,
74 Okla. Crim. 1, 122 P.2d 181 (1942).
70
See, e.g., Manning v. United States, 161 F.2d 827
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 792 (1947); In re
Maguth, 103 Cal. App. 572, 284 P. 940 (1930); State v.
Bonza, 106 Utah 553, 150 P.2d 970 (1944); PROBATION
AND
71 Cnmm.TAL. JUsrvc 31 (Glueck ed. 1933).
See United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347 (1928);
People v. Cannon, 162 Cal. App.2d 215, 328 P.2d 474
(1958).
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for determining the proper post-trial disposition
that the authority may require discretionary
powers. But the violation of a probation condition
is an objective fact which should be determined
by a more standardized method. Only after a
breach of conditions has been established does
discretionary power once again become appropriate
to decide how to rehabilitate the individual.
Third, if probation accomplishes its purpose of
rehabilitation, 72 then it is not so much a favor or
grace to criminals as it is a benefit to the state
itself. In seeking to gain this benefit, the state
should have the corresponding duty not to treat
probationers unfairly, particularly after the probationer, in reliance on his status, has actually
reformed. The surest way to do this is to provide
procedural protection to probationers at probation
revocation proceedings.
The need for some procedural safeguards at
probation revocation procedings has been generally
accepted. Although early probation statutes appear
to have followed the loose discretionary approach, 78
recent survey indicate a trend toward greater
procedural protection for probationersY4 A majority of the states already recognize probationer's
right to a hearing," notice of the charges against
72 Statistics show that the number of revocations is
less than 20% of the number of persons -placed on

probation.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S SURVEY Or RELEASE PROCEDnxs, vol. If, Probation,335-42 (1939) (about 19%);
UNITED STATES
1966 ANN. REP. Apmn. OFFICE ozrx
CouRTS 127 (less than 18%). See notes 10 and 27.

" Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216 (1932);

People v. Dudley, 173 Mich. 389, 138 N.W. 1044 (1912).
7
4 Sklar, Law and Practice in Probation and Parole
Revocation Hearings,55 3. C-an. L.C. & P.S. 175 (1964);
Brief for National Legal Aid and Defender Association

as Amincus Curiae, Appendix, Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S.

128 (1967). TnE MODEL PENAL ConE §301.4 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) provides as follows:
Section 301.4. Notice and Hearing on Revocation or Modification of Conditions or Suspension or Probation
The Court shall not revoke a suspension or
probation or increase the requirements imposed
thereby on the defendant except after a hearing
upon written notice to the defendant of the grounds
on which such action is proposed. The defendant
shall have the right to hear and controvert the
evidence against- him, to offer evidence in his
defense and to be represented by counsel.
7 E.g., People v. Euright, 332 Ill. App. 655, 75
N.E.2d 777 (1947); Blusinsky v. Commonwealth, 384
Ky. 395, 144 S.W.2d 1038 (1940); People v. Myers, 306
Mich. 100, 10 N.W.2d 323 (1943); People v. Hill, 164
Misc. 370, 300 N.Y.S. 532 (1937); State v. Burnette,
173 N.C. 734, 91 S.E. 364 (1917); State ex rel. Vadnais
v. Stair, 48 N.D. 472, 185 N.W. 301 (1921); Howe v.
State ex rel. Pyne, 170 Tenn. 571, 98 S.W.2d 93 (1936);
In re Hall, 100 Vt. 197, 136 A. 24 (1927). See cases cited
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him, 76 retained counsel,n the presentation of evi17
18
dence, cross-examination of adverse 'witnesses,
80
and appeal
in the annotations appearing in 54 A.L.R. 1471, 60
A.L.R. 1410, 132 A.L.R. 1248, and 29 A.L.R.2d 1074.
Cf. Note, Legal Aspects of Probation Revocation, 59
CoLumr. L. Rxv. 311 (1959); Comment, Dite Process
and Revocation of Conditional Liberty, 12 WA, E L.
REv. 638 (1966). Contra, cases cited in note 5, supra.
See generally, Sklar, Law and Practicein Probation and
Parole Revocation Hearings, 55 J. CRim. L.C. & P.S,

175 (1964).

Three states have statutes expressly authorizing
revocation without a hearing. IowA CoDE ANN. §247.26
(1949) permits revocation "without notice" to probationer; Mo. ANN. STAT. §549.101 (1965) permits
revocation "without hearing"; and OxLA. STATS. ANN
tit. 22, §992 (1958) provides that probationer shall be
arrested and "delivered forthwith" to the place to which
he was originally sentenced. Courts in these states have
held that there is no constitutional right to a hearing
either. Pagano v. Bechley, 211 Iowa 1294, 232 N.W.
798 (1930); Lint v. Bennett, 251 Iowa 1193, 104 N.W.2d
564 (1960); State v. Small, 386 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Mo.
1965) Ex parte Boyd, 73 Okla. Crim. 441, 122 P.2d
162, 170-71 (1942) (dictum).
Eight other jurisdictions, including California, have
statutes which do not indicate whether a hearing is or
is not required. As a result, some courts in these jurisdictions have held that there is no right to a probation
revocation hearing. In re Davis, 37 Cal. 2d 872, 236
P.2d 579 (1951); In re Dearo, 96 Cal. App.2d 141, 214
P.2d 585 (1950); Varela v. Merrill, 51 Ariz. 64, 74 P.2d
569 (1937); Ex parte Johnson, 53 Ariz. 161, 87 P.2d 107
(1939); Application of Jerrel, 77 S.D. 487, 93 N.W.2d
614 (1958).
California and Iowa allow ex parte revocation, a
proceeding which does not require the presence of the
probationer. People v. Scott, 74 Cal. App.2d 782, 169
P.2d 970 (1946). Oklahoma and South Dakota also permit such if the breach of conditions is clearly established. Ex parts Boyd, 73 Okla. Crim. at 459, 122 P.2d
at 170-71; Application of Jerrel, 77 S.D. at 492-93, 93
N.W.2d at 617; cf. United States ex rd. Edelson v.
Thompson, 175 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1949).
The majority of jurisdictions require a hearing for
probation revocation, although it may be summary in
nature. One writer has argued that California should
require a hearing. Comment, Revocation of Conditional
Liberty-Californiaand the Federal System, 28 S. CAL.
L. Rxv. 158 (1955). See generally Sklar, Law and Practice in Probation and Parole Revocation Hearings, 55
J. Can . L;C. & P.S. 175 (1964).
76 Dingler v. State, 101 Ga. App. 312, 113 S.E.2d 496
(1960); People v. Price, 24 Ill. App.2d 364, 376-77,
164 N.E.2d 528, 533 (1960); Crenshaw v. State, 222
Md. 533, 161 A.2d 669 (1960); People v. Oskroba, 305
N.Y. 113, 111 N.E.2d 235 (1953). See Sklar, Law and
Practice in Probation and Parole Revocation Hearings,
55 J. Cams. L.C. & P.S. 175, 188 (1964). See generally
Note, Legal Aspects of ProbationRevocation, 59 CoLum.
L. REv. 311, 326-28 (1959).
Some have suggested that proper notice includes
adequate time for counsel to inspect and investigate the
probation officer's report prior to the hearing. Comment, Reform in Probation Matters, Suggestions, 12
257 (1937). But generally, notice requirements
S. BR -J.
at revocation proceedings are less strict than at other
judicial proceedings. Jianole v. United States, 58 F.2d
115 (8th Cir. 1932). Most courts tend to regard the
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But the procedural rights afforded vary greatly
among jurisdictions, and a few states still do not
recognize any of the safeguards at probation rev81

ocation proceedings

In In, re LeVi,

82

an individual

convicted of assault had been granted probation
on the condition that he not indulge in intoxicating
liquor. A few days after his conditional release, the
probationer was arrested and subsequently convicted of intoxication. His probation officer recommended that probation be revoked and that the
individual be imprisoned as punishment for his
original crime. The probationer was brought
before the court for the following "hearing" on
this matter:
The Court: People v. Eddie D. Levi
Mr. Levi, they tell me you have had some
more trouble since you were out.
The Defendant: I went to Pedro to my
brother's...
hearing and notice requirements as one issue because
the hearing is inadequate if proper notice was not given.
Such may mean reversible error. People v. Hodges, 231
Mich. 656, 204 N.W. 801 (1925); Sellers v,State, 105
Nqb. 748, 181 N.W. 862 (1921); Slayton v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 357,38 S.E.2d 479 (1946).
i7
re Levi, 39 Cal. App.2d 41, 244 P.2d 403 (1952);
App. 2d 364, 377, 164 N.E.2d
People v. Price, 24 111.
528, 534 (1960); Edwardsen v. State, 220 Md. 82, 89,
151 A.2d 132, 136 (1959); Williams v. Commonwealth,
350 Mass. 732, 216 N.E.2d 779 (1966); People v. Wood,
2 Mich. App. 342, 139 N.W.2d 895 (1966); People v.
Hamilton, 26 App.Div.2d 134,271 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1966);
Thomas v. Maxwell, 175 Ohio St. 233, 235, 193 N.E.2d
150, 152 (1963); Perry v. Williard, 247 Ore. 145, 427
P.2d 1020 (1967) (semble). See Tix PRESIDENT'S COmrMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMInISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, THE CHAIENGE OF CRUE IN A FREE
SOCmTY 150 (1967); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
LAw ENFORCmEnNT AND ADmISTRATION or JUSTICE,
TAsy FORCE REPORT: TE CoURs, 54 (1967). Sklar,

The Court: You got into some sort of a drunken
brawl?
The Defendant: No. They say I was drunk.
The Court: Your wife has never come out
here and your children are still back in
Chicago, is that right?
The Defendant: Sure.
The Court: Well, because of the serious nature
of your offense, and because the Court specifically admonished you that you were not under
any circumstances to use intoxicating liquors
and because you rewarded the consideration
that was given you by going out and getting
drunk within five days after your release,
your probation is revoked.83
In California there is neither a constitutional
nor statutory right to notice and hearing preceding
revocation of probation. 4 Probation can be revoked
on the report of the probation officer alone. 5 Of
course, when a hearing is held, it may be summary
in nature, 86 the probationer having no right to
present or cross-examine wituessesY Proof beyond
a reasonable doubt is not necessary.P The right to
counsel is recognized where probation was granted
before sentence was pronounced.8 9 In other California cases, the right to retained counsel appears
uncertain, 0 and the right to assigned counsel is
not recognized in every court.91 Language in several
- Id.at 44, 244 P.2d at 405.
8 People v. Daugherty, 233 Cal. App.2d 284, 43 Cal.
Rptr. 446 (1965); supra, note 5; CAL. PENAL

CODE

§§1203.1-3.
8
-Cases cited note 21, supra.
8
In re Levi, 39 Cal. App.2d 41, 244 P.2d 403 (1951);
People v. Johns, 173 Cal. App.2d 38,34 P.2d 02 (1959);
People v. Wimberly 215 Cal. App.2d 538, 30 Cal. Rptr.
supra note 76, at 189, states that no court has denied 42187 (1963).
1In re Neison, 185 Cal. 594, 197 P. 947 (1921);
this right. But cf. People v. Dudley, 173 Mich. 389, 138
N.W. 1044 (1912). See generally Note, Legal Aspects of People v. Hayden, 99 Cal. App.2d 97, 221 P.2d 221
Probation Revocation, 59 CoLum. L. REv. 311, 328-30 (1950); People v. Slater, 152 Cal.'App.2d 814, 313 P.2d
111 (1957).
(1959).
78
,
Fiorella v. State, 40 Ala. App. 587, 590, 121 So.2d
8 People v. Sanders, 64 Cal. App. 1,220 P. 24 (1923);
875, 878 (1960); People v. Enright, 332 111. App. 655, 75 People v. Johns, 173 Cal. App.2d 38, 343 P.2d 92
N.E.2d 777 (1947); Mason v. Cochran, 209 Miss. 163, (1959).
8
1In re Levi, 39 Cal. App.2d 41, 244 P.2d 403 (1951).
46 So.2d 106 (1950); see Sklar, supra note 76, at 188.
The
theory underlying this rule is undoubtedly that
See °generally Note, Legal Aspects of Probation Revocathe revocation proceeding is still part of the prosecu59 CoLumJN. L. REv. 311,330-31 (1959).
fio0,
7Robinson v. State, 62 Ga. App. 539, 8 S.E.2d 698 tion since sentence was never imposed. See Mempa v.
(1940); People v. Oskroba, 305 N.Y. 113, 111 N.E.2d Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967); People v. Dewaele, 224 Cal.
235 (1953); City of Lima v. Beer, 90 Ohio App. 524, 107 App.2d 512,36 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1964).
9 Ex park Levi, 244 P.2d 403 (1952) (no right);
N.E.2d 253 (1950). See generally Note, supra note 78,
People v. Wimberly, 215 Cal. App.2d 538,30 Cal. Rptr.
at 330-31.
421 (1963) (no right). But see People v. Walker, 215 Cal.
88United States ex rel. Grossberg v. Mulligan, 48 F.2d
93 (2d Cir. 1931); Huff v. Diebold, 313 Ky. 655, 233 App.2d 609, 30 Cal. Rptr. 440 (1963) (probationer may
S.W.2d 276 (1950); People v. Turner, 27 App.Div.2d sometimes be represented by counsel); Gideon v.
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
141, 276 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1967). Contra, People v. Greg- Wainwright,
91
See in re Davis, 37 Cal.2d 872, 236 P.2d 579 (1951).
ory,
1 Crim. L. Rep. 2266 (Aug. 1967).
81
But see Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963);
See note 75, supra.
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
244 P.2d 403 (1952).
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judicial opinions betrays a disdain for "formal
criminal trials"; 92 many courts attempt by means
of strict statutory or constitutional interpretation
to limit procedural safeguards to the trial situation, regardless of subsequent proceedings which
could have a prejudicial impact upon the defend93
ant.
Thus, whether one who is accused of violating
the conditions of his probation will be given an opportunity to refute the charges against him may
depend upon the fortuitous circumstance of the
location of the hearing. Even within a given state
it is seldom clear which procedural rights he may
claim. Few statutes explicitly enumerate which
procedural safeguards are to be afforded and which
are not.04 Though variously worded, 90 the vast
majority of these statutes require a hearing of
some sort, 96 but some courts have interpreted
them to afford no further rights. 97
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Even if the legislature or courts of a jurisdiction
were persuaded to afford all of the aforementioned.
procedural safeguards, probationers would stilt
not be adequately protected. The standard of
proof at a probation revocation hearing is often
low, requiring only evidence which "reasonably
satisfies" the court. 8 The probation officer's report
may be conclusive of probationer's improper activity" even though clouded by prejudice and
error.100 Furthermore, the probationer is not
warned of his constitutional or statutory rights,
and his failure to exercise certain procedural rights
at the probation revocation hearing may constitute
a waiver of them 01 A majority of the jurisdictions.
do not afford probationers the right to subpoena.
witnesses or to obtain the appointment of counsel,
if indigent.' 0 ' If the individual cannot appeal his.
OSm. REv. STATS. §137.550(2) (1961); VT. STATs. ANNtit. 28, §1015 (1958); W. VA. CoD §62-12-19 (1966).

As stated by Sklar, supra note 76, at 188, "state and,
lower federal court decisions are legion which stress the
Ex parteLevi, 244 P.2d at 404 (1952).
See generally Comment, Revocation of Conditional informality of the hearing granted by their statutes".
Liberty-Californiaand the Federal System, 28 S.CAL. Whether the governing statute expressly provides for
L. REv. 158 (1955).
an informal hearing or not, cases which deny further
" ALAs. STATS. §33.05.070(b) (1962) ("reasonable procedural safeguards for probationers must advocate
notice" and "right to be represented by counsel");
such as the only alternative. But one could argue that
FLA. STAT. ANNl. §948.06 (1944) (probationer advised
even a "summary hearing" must imply a meaningful
of charges and given "opportunity to be fully heard on opportunity for an effective appearance. Perry v.
his behalf in person and by counsel"); GA. CODE ANN. Williard, 247 Ore. 145,427 P.2d 1020 (1967).
§27-2713 (1967 Supp.) (right to counsel and to be "fully
sManning v. United States, 161 F.2d 827 (5th Cir.),
heard"); HAwArr REV. LAws §§258-56, 253-5 (1955), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 792 (1947); Blaylock v. State, 8&
as amended, Act 179 (1967) (implies right to present Ga. App. 880, 78 S.E.2d 537 (1953); Bernal-Zazueta v.
evidence and provides right to assigned counsel); ILL. United States, 225 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1955); People v.
REv. STAT. ch. 38, §117-3 (1967) (right to appeal);
Valle, 7 Misc. 2d 125, 164 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1957).
Problems may arise where probation is revoked beMfcH. STAT. ANN.§28.1134 (1954) (right to "a written
cause of probationer's connection with a new crime.
copy of the charges"); MiNN. STAT. AN. §§609.14(2),
611.14(c) (1964) (right to retained counsel and assigned Since probation revocation hearings require a lesser
counsel); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§15-200, 15-200.1 (1965)
degree of proof and apply more relaxed standards of
(notice of charges and "a reasonable time for the de- evidence, a new criminal charge may cause probation
revocation even though probationer is acquitted of the
fendant to prepare his defense"); TEm. CODE §40-2907
(1956) (notice, right to counsel, "right to introduce charge. See People v. Kuduk, 320 Ill. App. 610, 51
testimony").
N.E.2d 997 (1943), appeal dismissed, 388 Ill. 248, 57
N.E.2d 755 (1944); State v. Greer, 173 N.C. 759, 92
91 hearing is required by 18 U.S.C. §3653 (1964),
which provides that the probationer shall be "taken S.E. 147 (1917). See generally, Note, Legal Aspects of
before the court", and by N.Y. Cans. Pxoc. §935 Probation Revocation, 59 CoLumE. L. Rlv. 311, 332-33
(McKinney 1968) which requires that the probationer
(1959).
shall have "An opportunity to be heard" by the revok11Hollandsworth v. United States, 34 F.2d 423 (4th
ing authority. Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935);
Cir. 1929). Contra, People v. Yarter, 138 Cal. App.2d
People v. Oskroba, 305 N.Y. 113, 111 N.E.2d 235 803, 292 P.2d 649 (1956); People v. Root, 192 Cal.
(1953). CAL. PENAL CODE §1203.2 (1954), on the other
App.2d 158, 13 Cal. Rptr. 209 (1961); People v. Walker,
hand, which provides that the authorities shall arrest a 215 Cal. App.2d 609,30 Cal. Rptr. 440 (1963).
probationer and "bring him before the court", does not
1"°See Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 493 (1935);
require a hearing. I_ re Davis, 37 Cal.2d 872, 236 P.2d Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 223 (1932);
Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 253 (D.C. Cir. 1963)
579 (1951).
(concurring opinion); Johnson v. Walls, 185 Ga. 177,
"See
note 75.
0'
19401S.E. 380 (1937).
Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935); Franklin v.
1 Varela v. Merrill, 51 Ariz. 64, 74 P.2d 569 (1937)
State, 87 Idaho 291, 392 P.2d 552 (1964); Shum. v.
Fogliani, 82 Nev. 156, 413 P.2d 495 (1966;) see Ex parte (right to hearing and to present evidence); Ex parte
Medley, 73 Idaho 474, 253 P.2d 794 (1953) (right to
Levi, supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
Nine states have statutes which explicitly provide present evidence and cross-examine witnesses).
102E.g., Franklin v. State, 87 Idaho 291, 392 P.2d
that the hearing may be summary or informal: ITDAo
552 (1964); Edwardsen v. State, 220 Md. 82, 151 A.2d
CODE §20-222 (1948); KAN. GEN. STATS. §62-2244
(1961); LA. RIV. STATS. §15:534(c) (1963); MONT. 132 (1959); People v. Wood, 2 Mich. App. 342, 139
Rv.
CoDF §94-9831 (1967); N.H. REv. STATS. ANN.
N.W.2d 895 (1966); State v. Small, 386 S.W.2d 379
(Mo. 1965); Shum v. Fogliani, 82 Nev. 156, 413 P.2d
ch. 504:4 (1955); NJ. STATS. ANN. §2A:168-4 (1953);
92
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probation revocation, then he must seek a writ of
habeas corpus and certain procedural irregularities
reviewable on appeal cannot be raised at the ensuing proceeding 0l If appeal is permitted, the
state is only required to introduce some evidence
in order to achieve an affirmance of the revocation,1 4 whereas it is usually necessary for the probationer to establish that the trial court abused its
wide discretion in order to obtain a reversal.00 It
is rare for an appellate court to make such a find6
ing
In short, the use of discretionary powerunchecked
by procedural protections can prevent probationers
from presenting a valid defense at a probation revocation proceeding and statutes have not gone
far enough to change this.
ConstitimonalDue ProcessArguments
In many cases where liberty has been revoked,
the limited nature of the statutory rights have led
probationers to assert a denial of their constitutional right to due process of law. Many theories
have been advanced to explain that the due process
°
clause is inapplicable to probation revocation10
Probation is considered by some a legislative grace
or privilege and not a constitutionally protected
495 (1966); People v. St. Louis, 3 App.Div.2d 883, 161
N.Y.S.2d 170 (1957); Thomas v. Maxwell, 175 Ohio St.
233, 193 N.E.2d 150 (1963). Contra, State v. Hoffman,
404 P.2d 644 (1967); People v. Price, 24 Ill.
App.2d 364,
377, 164 N.E.2d 528, 534 (1960); Williams v. Commonwealth, 350 Mass. 732, 216 N.E.2d 779 (1966) (dictum);
People v. Hamilton, 26 App.Div.2d 134, 271 N.Y.S.2d
694 (1966); Perry v. Williard, 247 Ore. 145, 427 P.2d
1020 (1967) (senible); Commonwealth ex rel. Remeriez
v. Maroney, 415 Pa. 534,204 A.2d 450 (1964).
103E.g., United States ex rel. Grossberg v. Mulligan,
48 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1931) (abuse of discretion in manner
of interpreting probation order); Moye v. Futch, 207
Ga. 52, 60 S.E.2d 137 (1950) (failure to allow
probationer to present or cross-examine witnesses);
Ex pare Patterson, 317 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. Ct. Crim.
App. 1958) (errors or irregularities which are not
jurisdictional).
I" Harrington v. State, 97 Ga. App. 315, 103 S.E.2d
126 (1958); State v. Miller, 122 S.C. 468, 115 S.E. 742
(1923). But cf. Cooper v. State, 175 Miss. 718, 168 So.
53, 54 (1936) ("evidence sufficient to convince a reasonable person"). See generally Note, Legal Aspects of
Probation Revocation, 59 Cous. L. Rlv. 311, 333
(1959).
100Manning v. United States, 161 F.2d 827 (5th Cir.),
cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 792 (1947); Waters v. State, 80 Ga.
App. 104,55 S.E.2d 677 (1949); Reinmuth v. State, 163
Neb. 724, 80 N.W.2d 874 (1957); People v. Koning, 18
Ill. App.2d 119, 151 N.E.2d 103 (1958).
100Comment, Revocation of Conditional Liberty-California and the Federal System, 28 S.CA. L. Rzv.
158,173 (1955). But cf. People v. Turner, 27 App.Div.2d
141,07276 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1967).
1 See note 64.

right;," s the probationer has entered into a contract with the state whereby his acceptance of
probation constitutes a waiver of due process
rights l Other theories are that probation is not
different from imprisonment because the probationer remains within the constructive custody of
the court,nO and that probation revocation is not
a "criminal prosecution" In giving probationer the
constitutional rights which he had and exhausted
at trial." Such justifications are of questionable
validity, as will be shown. It is beyond the scope
of this article to establish which procedural protections should attach at probation revocation
hearings. Hopefully, once courts realize the superficial quality of past theories they will engage in a
more thoughtful analysis of this problem.
The theory most frequently used to deny the
due process contentions of probationers is the
right-privilege distinction adopted by the Supreme
Court of the United Staes in Escoe v. Zerbst"'
wherein the Court stated:
...[W]e do not accept the petitioner's con-

tention that the privilege has a basis in the
Constitution, apart from any statute. Probation or suspension of sentence comes as an act
of grace to one convicted of a crime and may
be coupled with such conditions in respect of
4
its duration as Congress may impose
Yet probation should not be characterized as
only a mere privilege. Probation provides an alternative method for the state to deal with criminals. It is mutually beneficial and is only granted
108E.g., Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935); Varela
v. Merrill, 51 Ariz. 64, 74 P.2d 569 (1937); Pagano v.
Bechly, 211 Iowa 1294, 232 N.W. 798 (1930); People v.
Dudley, 173 Mich. 389, 138 N.W. 1044 (1912); State ex
rd. lenks v. Municipal Court of City of St. Paul, 197
Minn. 141, 266 N.W. 433 (1936); Shum v. Fogliani, 82
Nev. 156, 413 P.2d 495 (1966); State v. Duncan, 270
N.C. 241, 154 S.E.2d 53 (1967); In re Weber, 75 Ohio
App.
206, 61 N.E.2d 502 (1945).
109Fuller v. State, 122 Ala. 32, 26 So. 146 (1899);
Johnson v. Walls, 155 Ga. 177, 194 S.E. 380 (1937). See
Weihofen, Revoking Probation,Parole or Pardon Without a Hearing,32 J. Cnnw. L.C. & P.S. 531 (1942).
"'See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1962);
McCoy v. Harris, 108 Utah 407, 160 P.2d 721 (1945).
m Brown v. Warden, 351 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1965);
In re Dearo, 96 Cal. App.2d 141, 214 P.2d 585 (1950);
State v. Hewett, 270 N.C. 348,154 S.E.2d 476 (1967).
InBums v. United States, 287 U.S. 216 (1932); State
v. Hewett, 270 N.C. 348, 154 S.E.2d 476 (1967); cf.
Jones v. Rivers, 338 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1964).
1
U4

295 U.S. 490 (1935).

Id. at 492. This was merely dictum: the case was
reversed and remanded for failure to give the hearing
required by statute.
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to those deserving it. The Illinois Appellate Court
has stated:
Our courts have never taken the view that
it is a mere matter of favor or grace to admit
a defendant to probation. When an order to
that effect is entered by a court, the court has
satisfied itself that the defendant is not likely
to again engage in an offensive or criminal
course of conduct and that the public good
does not require that the defendant shall suffer
the penalty provided by law.... The fact
that a person has been adjudged guilty of a
criminal offense and subsequently granted
probation should not deprive him of a fair,
orderly hearing according to accepted judicial
principlesand recognized standardsof procedure
when it is sought to terminate that order.
When an order granting probation has been
entered and the court has imposed the conditions upon which defendant may be at liberty,
the defendant has a right to rely thereon and
as long as he complies with those conditions
his liberty of action or freedom should not be
restricted" 8 [emphasis added]
A probationer's status can only be revoked upon
a breach of conditions;-," it cannot be revoked
arbitrarily.1 Thus, the probationer does possess
certain rights which the incarcerated non-probationer does not possess. The different procedural
implications of seeking to gain and seeking to
continue a status have, for example, beenrecognized
in the economic "privileges" cases.' Revocation
of the right to practice law raises entirely different
and mre' substantial problems than were involved
115People v. Price, 24 Ill. App.2d 364, 377, 164
N.E.2d 528, 534 (1960).
WO
See note 70 supra.
n7 Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216 (1932);
Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935). See also Ohio
Bell Telephone Co. v. Commission, 301 U.S. 292, 302
(1937), where Mr. Justice Cardozo characterizes the
"protection of the individual against arbitrary action"
as the
very essence of the due process clause.
u8 Cramp v. Board of Public Education, 368 U.S.
278, 288 (1961) (teaching without taking anticommunist oath); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers
Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 897-98 (1961) (revocation of security clearance permit); Slochower' v.
Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956) (teaching despite exercising right against self-incrimination);
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (state
employment); cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
404-05 (1963) (unemployment compensation benefits);
Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960) (Social
Security benefits).
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in determining whether the privilege should have
been granted initially" 9
Few explanations have been made of how such
rights can attach to a privilege. The restriction
against arbitrary action has its basis in the due
process clause. But it has been suggested that a
distinction should be drawn between substantive
due process rights, which are granted probationers,
and procedural due process rights, which are not. 120
This is incorrect. The issue in these cases concerns
the probationer's procedural rights. Probationers
do not claim that the law itself is arbitrary because
then not only the revocation clause but also very
likely the granting clause would be unconstitutional
and void, in which case probationers would be
returned to prison. Rather, the claim is that lack
of procedural protection permits arbitrary factual
determinations, thus detracting from the probationer's procedural due process rights.' 2 In Burns
v. United States,' the Court issued its directive
against arbitrary action to the judge who exercises
his discretion to make factual determinations without affording certain procedural protections to
the appellant. The Court was not concerned with
potential denials of substantive due process rights.
However, since Escoe subsequently declared a
hearing to be merely a "privilege" and not a constitutionally protected right, the basis of the restriction against arbitrary action is not clear.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of the United
States has recognized that probationers have some
right and'protection for their status.
-This right of probationers as compared to
prisoners without probation becomes particularly
significant in jurisdictions where one who accepts
probation waives certain due process rights.'
It has been held in at least one state that one who
accepts probation cannot appeal his trial decision."
119
Compare Massengale v. United States, 278 F.2d
344 (6th Cir. 1960) -aith Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) and Konigsberg v.
State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
120
Comment, Revocation of Conditional Liberty-

Californiaand the Federal-System, 28 S.CAL. L. REv.
158, 166 (1955); cf. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C.
Cir. 1963).
ut See-United States v. Mazei, 345 U.S. 206, 21828
(1952) (dissenting opinion); 29 A.L.R.2d 1078 (1953).
287 U.S. 216 (1932).

123Pagano

v. Bechly, 211 Iowa 1294, 232 N.W. 798
(1930); Couture v. Brown, 82 N.H. 459, 135 A. 530
(1926); Wilson v. State, 156 Tex. Crim. 228, 240 S.W.2d
774 (1951).
124
Brooks v. State, 51 Ariz. 544, 78 P.2d 489 (1938).
See also Cooper v. State, 175 Miss. 718, 168 So. 53
(1936); People ex re. Palladino v. Warden, 6 Misc.2d
691,167 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1957).
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Other cotirts have denied procedural protections
to a criminal from the time that he accepts probation to the time that he is released, arguing that
the probationer waives his constitutional claims
at the time of, probation by entering into a contract with the state whereby he agrees tq perform
certain conditionsuO Although the contract theory
has been approved in subsequent caseA before
state courts,12 the Supreme Court rejected it in
Burns, describing probation as a "favor not a
contract".1 '2 Particularly in jurisdictions where a
convicted' criminal must consent to probation 34
the alternative of imprisonment would seem to be
a sufficient coercive force to invalidate any such
idea of a contractual waiver.m But the right against
arbitrary revocation provides additional protection to the probationer in jurisdictions that still
espouse waiver theories.
For reasons of accuracy and policy, the terms
"privilege," "grace," and "favor" should apply to
the sentencing court's discretion in granting probation and not to the continuance of probationer's
conditional liberty. At the very least the terms are
without value in this context because probation
cannot be characterized as a mere privilege.
Even if probation can be properly characterized
as a privilege, such a characterization has little, if
any, analytical significance. The right-privilege
distinction merely restates legal conclusions previously made. It presumes the conclusion in its
premises and adds no justification of its own. The
theory gives no insight into either constitutional
rights or legislative intention. Such a theory
certainly should not be dispositive of the issue
whether probationer shall have the opportunity to
justify his continued conditionalliberty.
Even granting the value of the right-privilege
distinction at the time of Escoe, serious question
may be raised as to its applicability today. The
judiciar has recently recognized that substantive
rights are of little value without procedural
methods which enable their presentation 3 ProW See cases cited in note 109, supra.,
126Johnson v. Walls, 155 Ga. 177, 194 S.E. 380 (1937);

Wilson'v. State, 156 Tex. Crim. 228, 240 S.W.2d 774
(1951); cf. State v. Bufford, 231 Iowa 1000, 2 N.W.2d

635 (1942).

U 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932).
I Cooper v. United States, 91 F.2d 195 (5th Cir.
1937); Ex parte Boyd, 73 Okla. Crim. 441, 122 P.2d 162
(1942); State v. Farmer, 39 Wash.2d 675, 237 P.2d 734
1951).
129Cf. Johnson v. Zerbst, 3041U.S. 458,464(1938). •
130
See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

cedural rights have been extended to both pretriall i and post-conviction 2 processes. Although
the right-privilege distinction previously enjoyed
great favor in the license and welfare benefit cases,
the Supreme Court of the United States h1as required protection in those cases despite the distinction,13 apparently recognizing that there is no
absolute distinction between "rights" and "privileges," these being simply different degrees of
protection 1 4 In short, constitutional claims should
not be denied on the basis of such a fictitious
polarization of social concerns, designed to perpetuate the satus quo and wholly lacking in analytical
value.
Finally, even if the right-privilege distinction
were applied most strongly to treat a probationer
as merely a prisoner with conditional liberty,
constitutional language would be less warped and
policy would: be better served if procedural protections were granted probationers. Since probation
did not exist at common law'13 and since prisoners
were never afforded any of the procedural advantages now sought by probationers, it could, be
argued that the creation of an opportunity for
probation by the legislatures or the courts did not
intend to afford the probationer any additional
constitutional rights. But the similarities of probation and imprisonment dd not justify this conclusion' 36 It is true that the probationer has no more
constitutional rights than the prisoner at the moment of sentencing. However, having been granted
a liberty which the prisoner does not have, the
probationer is in a position to assert certain consitutional rights which the prisoner cannot. As one
writer has observed:
...it is suggested that the freedom of action
which a probationer enjoys prior to revocation
is sufficiently extensive that it should be considered "liberty" within the meaning of a due
process clause, either by viewing the granting
of probation as a restoration of a part of the
liberty of which the offender, had duly been
M Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
1n Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967); Townsend
v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
VI See cases cited innotes 95 and 96, supra.
134O'Neil, UnconstittionalConditions: Wdfare Benefits With Strings Attached, 54 CA=. L. REv. 443, 445-46
(1966).
33
See note 11, supra.
136
See Weber, Explorationsin the Similarities,Differences and Conflicts Between Probation,Parole and Institutions, 48 J. CRM. L.C. &P.S. 580 (1958).
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deprived by his conviction and by then viewing the revocation of probation as a deprivation of the restored liberty, or by theorizing
that the offender was deprived of only part of
his liberty when his conviction resulted in his
being put on probation and that incarceration
upon revocation of probation represents a
further deprivation of libertyis'
Courts have advanced two arguments against
this. Some have contended that the probationer is
not actually at liberty but rather is under "constructive custody" by means of an "extension of
the prison walls." I Such excess fictionalizingflouts
the common sense. A probationer's liberty is incomparably closer to the "unconditional" liberty
which law-abiding citizens enjoy than to imprisonment.
Other courts have distinguished probation revocation proceedings from "criminal prosecutions,"
thereby obviating the constitutional requirements
of the latter."' Where the trial court suspended the
imposition of sentence in placing a person on probation, the Supreme Court of the United States has
rejected this argument and condemned the denial
of the right to counsel as unconstitutional 0 This
protection should also be required when there has
been a suspended execution of sentence. Despite
subsequent cases to the contrary in state and lower
federal courts,' 4 ' there is no valid distinction between the two types of sentencing because a probationer's liberty is at stake in either case. Furthermore, merely providing procedural protection at
immediate post-conviction sentencing may be
insufficient. Those granted probation normally
would receive at least as short a sentence as others
because of their capacity for rehabilitation. Yet
they may receive a longer sentence from a judge
who is aware that it will only be served upon the
commission of a further offense in violation of the
probation conditions he prescribes. 42 No such
formalistic distinction between imposition and
execution of sentence should result in the imprisonment of a probationer for post-trial acts or omissions of which he was never convicted.
1N ote, Legal Aspects of Probation Revocation, 59

CoLS.
L. Rv. 311, 325-26 (1959).
11
8See cases cited in note 110, supra.
139
See cases cited in note 111, supra.
"0Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967). The arguments, as reported at 2 CarM. L. REP. 2036 (1967),
indicate that the Court wished to proceed cautiously.
' See note 19, supra.
142See note 20, supra.No statistics were found on the

length of sentences imposed on probationers at trial.
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On the other hand, a few state courts have held
that a probationer does have a constitutional right
to certain procedural protections before his status
can be revoked 4 They have referred to probation
as a "valuable right" 144which probationer "should
be able to rely upon" 145 so long as he obeys the
conditions of his liberty. Several other state courts
have referred to the probationer's possession of
certain "rights" in regard to his status. 146 The
policy arguments often weigh heavily in the
probationer's favor and some courts have stated
that procedural rights "may be desirable" even
while denying probationer's claim.' 0 Such concessions are significant when determining whether
certain due process rights attach since this determination has often rested on rather pragmatic
policy considerations.14 8
Because of the pragmatic character of the due
process clause, the conclusion that the clause applies to probation revocation proceedings does not
dispose of the problem of which procedural rights
are thereby guaranteed to the probationer. For
example, except where there is an issue as to the
identity of defendant and the person originally
sentenced,"4 no court has stated that probationer
has a right to trial by jury at his revocation proceeding.' The due process clause need not change
this result: a jury is not necessarily required merely
because other procedural rights are. Some courts
have gone beyond this and stated that affording
any additional procedural rights will cause endless
'Brill v. State, 159 Fla. 682, 32 So.2d 607 (1947)
(dictum) (hearing and notice); Ex parle Lucero, 23
N.M. 433, 168 P. 713 (1917), followed in State v.
Peoples, 69 N.M. 106, 364 P.2d 359 (1961) (hearing and
notice); Perry v. Williard, 247 Ore. 145, 427 P.2d 1020
(1967) (right to appointment of counsel); State v.
Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 259 P. 1044 (1927), limited
somewhat by Baine v. Beckstead, 10 Utah 2d 4, 347
P.2d 554 (1959) (hearing and notice); State v. O'Neal,
174 Wash. 169, 265 P. 175 (1928), approved in State v.
Shannon, 60 Wash.2d 883,376 P.2d 646 (1962).
'St
part Lucero, 23 N.M. 433, 168 P. 713 (1917);
State v. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 259 P. 1044 (1927).
'45 People v. Price, 24 Il. App.2d 364,377, 164 N.E.2d
528, 534 (1960); Baine v. Beckstead, 10 Utah 2d 4, 9,
347 P.2d 554,558 (1959).
146E.g., Hoffman v. State, 404 P.2d 644 (Alaska
1965); In re Dearo, 96 Cal. App.2d 141, 214 P.2d 585
(1950).
1"7Shum v. Fogliani, 82 Nev. 156, 413 P.2d 495
(1966).
'48See Joint-Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 149 (1951) (concurring
opinion).
149State v. Peoples, 69 N.M. 106,364 P.2d 359 (1961).
110E.g., People v. Price, 24 Ill. App.2d 364, 164
N.E.2d 528 (1960); Wilson v. State, 156 Tex. Crim. 228,
240 S.W.2d 774 (1951).
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delay and will overburden the courts.i5 But it is
doubtful that any solution would be more burdensome than the present confusion, especially since
the practical effect on the courts of requiring some
further procedural rights as a matter of due process
would probably not be great. In light of the fact
that a majority of the states already recognize
probationer's right to a hearing, notice of the
charges against him, counsel, the presentation of
evidence and witnesses, cross-examination of those
witnesses testifying against him, and appeal,"' it
would not appear that a constitutional recognition
of these rights would cause substantial turmoil.
Nor would it seem that an extension of similar
53
rights to those who have no knowledge of them
1
or to those who have no means of obtaining them'
would significantly overburden the probation
system. The benefits, on the other hand, would be

to make the realities of probation more consistent
with its goals and to eliminate much of the error,
uncertainty, confusion, and geographic inequity
which presently prevails.
CONCLUSION

Discretionary power performs a necessary function in the implementation of probation. The imposition of individualized conditions is probation's
peculiar strength. At present, it is largely the experience of the personnel, rather than the framework of the system, that makes probation work.
Hopefully the gathering of research and statistical
data will enable probation to become a behavioral
science, with improved techniques and guidelines
for supervision. But at least for now the states and
federal government should take a step in this
direction by placing and enforcing limitations on
the conditions that can be imposed on probationers.
161Cf. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963);
In this way some of the abuses and errors of the
v. Rivers, 338 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1964).
Jones
system can be eliminated.
53
' Notes 75-80, supra.
No mere limitations, however, will justify the
153E.g., abolishment of the waiver rule in regard to
procedural irregularities at revocation, warnings con- place of discretionary power in the factual deterceming constitutional or statutory rights, etc.
minations of a probation revocation proceeding. A
154E.g., the appointment of counsel to indigents, the
right to subpoena witnesses, etc. The equal protection fair and just disposition of individuals can only be
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is particularly achieved by eliminating discretionary power and
significant in gaining these rights. See Hoffman v. affording appropriate procedural protections to
State, 404 P.2d 644 (Alaska 1965); Perry v. Williard,
probationers.
427 P.2d 1020 (Ore. 1967).
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(Notes prepared by Leonard Singer, assisted by Robert A. Filpi and Bradford J. Race. The opinions
expressed therein are not necessarily those of the Journal's Editors.)
"[W]e must consider the two objects of desire,
both of which we cannot have, and make up
our minds which to choose. It is desirable that
criminals should be detected and to that-end
that all available evidence should be used. It
also is desirable that the Government should
not itself foster and pay for other crimes, when
they are the means by which the evidence is to
1
be obtained.... We have to choose ....
Alderman v. United States: Standing
and Disclosure
The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
I Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
Alderman v. United States2 dealt with electronic
surveillance which is subject to the dictates of
this Amendment whether or not there is an actual physical intrusion of the premises for the
"Constitution protects people-and not simply
'areas' ". This provision is a bar to the "uninvited
ear" and allows persons to assume that the words
they speak in confidence "will not be broadcast to
2394 U.S. 165 (1969).
3
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,353 (1967).

